Some 80 years after the Second World War, geopolitics have once more morphed into armed conflict on our continent, claiming lives daily in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale war has resurrected the ghosts of Europe’s past we hoped had been put to rest long ago. This year, another anniversary calls to mind lost opportunities. August 2025 marks 50 years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which established a European security settlement blending confrontation and cooperation based on shared principles. The finely woven web of international institutions and agreements that has ensured the peace on our continent is in existential crisis. Not only that, but far-right forces are seeking to undermine the institutions, laws and norms carefully built up over decades from within. In these dangerous times, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Security Radar aims to convey the concerns, priorities, fears and hopes of those most affected by today’s geopolitical milieu. Our survey of 14 countries, including the two warring parties, offers valuable insights.
Security Radar 2025 examines how public attitudes have evolved in France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States. Newly added countries are Sweden, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.
You can find more information via our Regional Office for International Cooperation & Peace Vienna here.
You can download the full study here.
Latvians perceive the well-being of their country as linked to positive developments in other nations and exhibit low approval of a «my country first» approach. This is the result of a representative study conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung across 14 countries in the OSCE area, among others the US, Russia, and Ukraine. Latvians emphasise their country’s strategic dependence on alliance: Some 68 per cent of Latvians perceive that the well-being of their country is linked to positive developments in other nations. At 48 per cent, their approval of a «my country first» approach is the lowest among all polled countries. 74 per cent believe that Latvia lacks sufficient defensive capabilities and could not defend itself if Russia declared war, the second-highest figure in the poll alongside Georgia. Around 53 per cent see of Latvians polled view the EU as vulnerable without US support. Support for an EU Army remains consistent at 50 per cent and has not increased since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Concerns about Russia as a threat to European security remain high at 71 per cent. By stark contrast, among the Russian-speaking minority’s this value is at just 8 per cent. Within this minority, perceptions of a US threat have risen significantly to 52 per cent, compared with 28 per cent of the total population. Nearly 70 per cent express a desire for greater independence from the US. Perceptions of NATO enlargement towards the Russian border and of the EU towards the East diverge from those of the other polled countries. Latvians tend not to view them as a threat to European security, while concerns are rising in other surveyed countries.
Half of respondents see Russia as a threat for Europe. Around 53%, above the average, see the EU as vulnerable without US support. Furthermore, 74% believe that Latvia lacks sufficient defensive capabilities and could not defend itself if Russia declared war, the second-highest figure in the poll alongside Georgia. Both are comparatively small countries directly neighbouring Russia.
A majority (77%) view the end of the war against Ukraine as essential for improving European security. Concerns about Russia as a threat to European security remain high at 71%. By stark contrast, the Russian-speaking minority’s perception is just 8%. What’s more, within this minority, perceptions of a US threat rise significantly to 52%, compared with 28% of the total population.
Perceptions of NATO enlargement towards the Russian border and of the EU towards the East diverge from those of the other polled countries. Latvians tend not to view them as a threat to European security, while concerns are rising in other surveyed countries. Support for diplomacy as a means of resolving foreign policy crises has decreased, from 69% in 2021 to 58% in 2024. Reluctance toward military intervention in conflicts remains high, with 67% rejecting it, the same level as 2021.
For leadership in EU security, the trio of Germany, France, and Poland is most commonly seen as the leading force (36%), although 21% responded ‘don’t know’. Support for an EU Army remains consistent at 50% and has not increased since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Nearly 70% express a desire for greater independence from the US. To stabilise European security after the war, 38% advocate that Latvia should foster channels of communication with Russia. Russian-speaking minority tends to be more pro-Russian, sees media reporting as not objective and shows less support for Ukraine.
The study shows strong public support for increased defence spending. At the same time, however, there are concerns that resources for social cohesion may be insufficient. Notably, 48 per cent of all respondents support a special tax on the wealthy to meet military spending requirements. Maintaining Europe’s defence capability will not only depend on military build-up but also on democratic and societal resilience. Striking a balance between defence and social spending will therefore be crucial for sustaining societal cohesion in democracies as they navigate geopolitical tensions.
Both in Russia and Ukraine there is a clear desire for negotiations to bring an end to the war. In Russia, 62 per cent believe that their country has become stronger as a result of the war against Ukraine. However, a majority of 52 per cent of respondents below 40 years of age would recognise Ukrainian sovereignty, and 44 per cent of Russians under 30 years of age attribute the responsibility for the war to Russia. For Russians in general, the United States remains the clear adversary to their country.
For Latvians a majority (77%) view the end of the war against Ukraine as essential for improving European security. Concerns about Russia as a threat to European security remain high at 71%. By stark contrast, the Russian-speaking minority’s perception is just 8%. What’s more, within this minority, perceptions of a US threat rise significantly to 52%, compared with 28% of the total population. Perceptions of NATO enlargement towards the Russian border and of the EU towards the East diverge from those of the other polled countries. Latvians tend not to view them as a threat to European security, while concerns are rising in other surveyed countries. Support for diplomacy as a means of resolving foreign policy crises has decreased, from 69% in 2021 to 58% in 2024. Reluctance toward military intervention in conflicts remains high, with 67% rejecting it, the same level as 2021. For leadership in EU security, the trio of Germany, France, and Poland is most commonly seen as the leading force (36%), although 21% responded ‘don’t know’. Support for an EU Army remains consistent at 50% and has not increased since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Nearly 70% express a desire for greater independence from the US. To stabilise European security after the war, 38% advocate that Latvia should foster channels of communication with Russia.
The Latvian public remains predominantly pessimistic about future developments, although younger Latvians display more optimism.
The nation prioritises national security and sees limited value in cooperation beyond its core aspirations and principles. Latvian respondents are willing to reduce dependencies on countries that do not align with their values (64%). International engagement without direct benefits ranks relatively low (32% approval). Given the country’s defensive position, there is a slight decline in Latvia's stance on pursuing an active foreign policy and playing a significant role in solving international problems (2021: 54%, 2024: 49%). Therefore, 50% declare that military deterrence in the Baltic Sea should be a priority for Latvia's foreign policy.
Climate change ranks low among Latvian priorities. Only 30%, below the poll average, support taking all possible measures to combat it, while nearly half favour adaptation strategies. Latvia’s relatively low approval of international cooperation on climate change may reflect its focus on domestic challenges.
Diplomatic efforts are viewed as legitimate, but their perceived effectiveness is lower than in 2021. Overall, Latvia's defensive posture aligns with its growing regional significance within NATO and the EU. Latvia's top priorities are combating terrorism (53%), addressing geopolitical tensions (51%) and military build-up (37%).
Latvia's military spending has risen, accelerated by Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The government plans to increase defence spending, with a target of 3% of GDP by 2027, ranking it among NATO's top four contributors by share of GDP. Approval for higher military spending has risen from 37% in 2021 to 49% in 2024, while 40% remain opposed. Overall, Latvians favour social and economic spending over defence (60%). If defence spending is necessary, they prefer a special levy on the rich (47%) over cutting social or economic funds (18%).
Approval for higher military spending has risen from 37% in 2021 to 49% in 2024.
This version, adapted by: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Office for the Baltic States Dzirnavu 37-64 Riga, LV-1010, LatviaSubscribe here to receive FES Office for the Baltic States latest news and invitations for events and collaboration!
is based on Security Radar 2025 by: FES Regional Office for International Cooperation Cooperation and Peace Reichsratsstr. 13/5, A-1010 Vienna Phone: +43 1 890 38 11 205 Responsible Christos Katsioulispeace.vienna(at)fes.de
February 2025 © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V
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